[ad_1]
India’s new Brahmos II hypersonic missile may incorporate technology used in Russia’s Tsirkon hypersonic weapon, a development that will further strengthen the two sides’ deepening defense cooperation as India faces Western pressure to distance itself from Moscow.
BrahMos II is jointly developed by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Russian NPO Mashinostroynia, and the successor to BrahMos I supersonic cruise missile is jointly developed by the two parties.
According to Atul Rane, CEO of BrahMos Aerospace, India and Russia have done the basic design for BrahMos II and it will take five to six years before the first weapon test.
He also stated that since India is a member of the Missile Technology Control System (MTCR), BrahMos II will not be exported; This means that India can manufacture missiles with a range of more than 300 km and weigh more than 500 kg, but cannot sell them, he said. Weapons to third countries.
In the year While Western sanctions imposed on Russia’s defense industry over its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its invasion of Ukraine this year have crippled Russia’s defense industry, Rane notes that these sanctions have not affected the development of the Brahmos II project, TASS reports.
If the BrahMos II project is pushed, it will show that Russia still has trump cards to play to keep the defense industry alive. In the year In a 2021 issue of the Journal of Global Affairs, Viljar Veble noted that Russia could export weapons with an open and relatively generous arms export policy, proven weapons systems, and road dependence. Russia has played these cards effectively to keep India on its toes, especially in the development of hypersonic weapons.
At the same time, India is aware of the strategic consequences of dependence on Russian weapons and military technologies. Asia Times reports that India is overly dependent on Russian military hardware.
No strings attached.
Vebel noted that Russia, unlike other Western arms exporters, does not place restrictions or conditions on arms sales and has given many benefits to allies such as Iran, Syria, Algeria, Egypt and Libya. These include better negotiated terms, loans and faster shipping, and these countries benefit from buying weapons from Russia over other suppliers.
In the case of India, Sameer Lalwani et al., in a 2021 article in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, noted that Cold War-era relations between India and Russia, their geopolitical interests, technically shaped the perspectives of a multi-polar international system. Cooperation and Russia’s motivation to influence Indian policymakers and defense planners may explain Russia’s unusually generous arms sales and technology contracts with India.
They also highlight that Russia has assisted India in various high-level strategic projects; For example, by refurbishing India’s Vikramaditya carrier and building India’s first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), Arihant, it is part of India’s strategic nuclear defense submarine.
Considering these previous bilateral successes, BrahMos II may not be different from the high-level military cooperation model, building on the strategies based on the BrahMos I supersonic cruise missile.
Vebel also noted that one of Russia’s strengths is its export of proven weapons, which, while significantly lower than Western manufacturers, is still considered sufficient for current conflicts in the developing world.
In terms of hypersonic weapons, in a 2022 Izvestia article, defense analyst Alexei Ramm argued that US hypersonic weapons could be overly complex, citing the weapon’s two-stage design and requiring the integration of multiple subsystems. This time-consuming process requires many expensive tests.
He also stated that Russia’s Tsirkon does not need a second stage to make a hypersonic weapon. The simplicity and reliability of the Russian Tsirkon design plays a major role in India’s choice to partner with Russia to develop the BrahMos II hypersonic missile.
Strategic altruism
Moreover, Vebel cites “path dependence” as the reason why India continues to buy weapons from Russia despite the threat of Western sanctions. Arms sales do not stop at just the transfer of weapons, but include the entire procurement system, which includes maintenance, training, supply of spare parts, high-level government-to-government talks and personnel exchanges.
He pointed out that it is easier and cheaper to rely on existing supply chains and cooperation strategies than to establish new ones.
Since India’s independence in 1947, India has defined strategic autonomy as an important part of its foreign policy. Moreover, India no doubt understands the ulterior motives behind Russia’s generous defense cooperation deals.
Lalwani and others argue that despite Russia’s strategic ambitions in defense cooperation, Russia has not been able to gain exclusive access to Indian military bases and intelligence facilities, and that Russia has not successfully found a community of Indian officers who voice pro-Russian policy ideas within the Indian defense establishment. .
Indeed, India may harbor deep misgivings about the implications of Russia-China relations for its hypersonic weapons program.
In the year In a 2020 Raksha Anirvada defense magazine, defense analyst Rakesh Simha noted that Russian-Chinese cooperation in hypersonic weapons research is growing and suggested that Russia could share sensitive technology with China that could harm India.
He also pointed out that falling oil prices and Western sanctions would give Russia more incentive to transfer sensitive hypersonic weapons technology to China in order to gain much-needed revenue.
Threat of sanctions
The threat of US sanctions on joint defense activities between Russia and India may have made India question its long-term dependence on Russia.
In the year In a joint publication between the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and Gateway House in 2018, Aleksey Kuprianov and other authors explicitly mention the sanctions against the US Treasury’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya.
While the US has not imposed strict sanctions on India’s DRDO over Rosoboronexport and NPO Machinostroynia, if the US chooses to do so, it could trigger sanctions on dollar-based payments between Russia and India for the BrahMos II project.
In this regard, Simha said India is pursuing separate hypersonic weapon projects in parallel with BrahMos II. For example, he mentioned that India’s domestic Hypersonic Technology Demonstration Vehicle (HSTDV) was funded and researched separately from the Brahmos II.
Another such project is the Shaurya ballistic missile, which has reached Mach 7.5 in recent tests. He also mentioned that India has built 12 hypersonic wind tunnels to gain confidence in the development of hypersonic weapons.
Despite these caveats on Russian-Indian defense cooperation, the dynamics of these relationships established and proven could be more practical for advancing the hypersonic weapons program.
At the same time, India will pursue similar domestic projects if Western sanctions against Russia prevent further cooperation in hypersonic weapons development, if Russian hypersonic weapons technology is compromised, or if Russia or India decide to end cooperation in hypersonic weapons development for whatever reason. Reason.
[ad_2]
Source link
